Most attackers know that write access to an IIS web root can lead to code execution. Fewer realise that, when weaponised properly, IIS can become a powerful platform for lateral movement.
This research shows how a single ASPX page can deliver full in memory native execution inside the trusted IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) – allowing stealthy execution and movement without a traditional on disk payload.
In this paper, you’ll learn:
- How IIS can be transformed from a web server into a post compromise execution platform
- How a single ASPX file can enable fileless, in memory native code execution
- Why IIS is a high value target for persistence and lateral movement
- How modern attackers evade static detection by operating inside trusted processes
- What defenders should monitor when fileless does not mean invisible
Who it’s for:
- Red teamers looking for realistic, low noise lateral movement techniques
- Blue teamers and SOC analysts investigating fileless execution in IIS environments
- Threat hunters focused on memory resident activity in trusted Windows processes